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The Case for Stewart over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance
Abstract
This Article explains why the government’s physical surveillance can reach a point in terms of duration and
intensity that it becomes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. As references, Katz v. United States and
Kyllo v. United States stand out from the canon. Katz, decided in 1967, swept away a prior emphasis on
property rights and trespass laws to hold that the electronic monitoring of a phone booth was a search. Since
then, the two-part test from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion has received as much attention as the totality-
of-the-circumstances test in Justice Stewart’s majority opinion. Kyllo, decided just months before 9/11, ruled
that the government’s use of a thermal-imaging device from outside a house was a search. For the era after 9/
11, a blend of Justice Harlan’s test in Katz with Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo reproduces Justice Stewart’s
test, a more open-ended test which makes room for property, liberty, secrecy, anonymity, autonomy, and
privacy, as well as other values that may undergird the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” For the new age of terror, Justice Stewart’s test helps not only on one issue of
physical surveillance but also opens up new approaches to data mining, the use of GPS devices, and other
issues at the intersection of national security, privacy, and technology.
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My premise is that the government's physical surveillance can reach a
point in terms of duration and intensity that it becomes a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. If one accepts the common sense of this premise, the
law of surveillance should change. The changes can come from the
Executive branch by orders, regulations, or guidelines; from Congress by a
statute that gives citizens more protections from governmental intrusions
than the courts have given so far; or from the courts by new holdings that do
a better job of balancing individual freedom against the government's duty to
protect us from dangers, including terrorist attacks.
If, by doctrinal change, some types of physical surveillance are accepted
as a search, subsidiary questions present themselves. Is a warrant required?
Probable cause? Reasonable suspicion? Or is an even lower standard possi-
ble that recognizes that terrorism cases are significantly different from
ordinary cases? If individual suspicion is not there, the government might
attempt to justify a search through some "special need." But arguing for a
special need (say, in a sobriety checkpoint) is quite different in doctrinal
terms from arguing that a search did not occur at all (say, in a canine sniff of
a piece of luggage).1 This Article, while not indifferent to these subsidiary
questions, does not specify the appropriate level of suspicion for pervasive,
physical surveillance. Nor does it apply the proposed framework to rework
all Supreme Court cases since 1967 on what constitutes a search. Instead,
this Article examines just one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
through the dark lens of 9/11.
In helping to answer when governmental action becomes a search, Katz
v. United States2 and Kyllo v. United States3 stand out from the canon. De-
pending on one's point of view, Kyllo may be the last case from the Katz era
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Professor Radsan is a former federal
prosecutor. He thanks Adam Pabarcus, Christopher Proczko, and Dan Ryan for their outstanding
research assistance.
1. Compare Andrea J. Cook, Sobriety Checkpoints Deter Dnnken Drivers, RAPID CITY J.,
Mar. 15, 2010, available at http://www.rapidcityjoumal.com/news/article_O2ab6a3c-2fdc-lldf-
b99d-001cc4c03286.html (discussing the implementation and effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints), with David G. Savage, High Court to Rule on 'Canine Sniff' Search, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2004, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/06/nationlna-scotus6 (discussing a
case in which prosecutors argued that a dog sniffing the air does not amount to a search).
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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or the first case from a new era. Katz, decided in 1967, swept away a prior
emphasis on property rights and trespass laws to hold that the electronic
monitoring of a phone booth was a search. 4  Since then, the two-part test
from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has received as much attention as
the totality-of-the-circumstances test in Justice Stewart's majority opinion.
5
Kyllo, decided just months before 9/11, ruled that the government's use of a
thermal-imaging device from outside a house was a search.6 For the era after
9/11, a blend of Justice Harlan's test in Katz with Justice Scalia's opinion in
Kyllo reproduces Justice Stewart's test, a more open-ended test which makes
room for property, liberty, secrecy, anonymity, autonomy, and privacy, as
well as other values that may undergird the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.",7 Justice Stewart's test helps
not only on one issue of physical surveillance but also opens up new ap-
proaches to data mining and other Fourth Amendment issues at the
intersection of national security, privacy, and technology.
II. Implications of Another Terrorist Attack
Before the next terrorist attack-and the ensuing panic that will make
civil-libertarian proposals even more difficult to achieveS-I challenge the
consensus that all physical surveillance falls outside the Fourth Amendment.
9
For these purposes, I limit my analysis to trends in the courts and in aca-
demic commentary since 9/11. A sympathetic reader might accept this
limitation for at least two reasons. First, the space for a symposium piece
does not permit an extensive review of related Fourth Amendment topics:
4. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that electronic monitoring of a telephone booth violated
the Fourth Amendment, despite the lack of physical intrusion into the booth).
5. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541, 568 (1988) (noting that the
result in Katz derived from Harlan's concurrence is "universally praised while the majority opinion
either is ignored or deprecated").
6. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 ("[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use." (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961))).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing that Fourth Amendment searches should be
judged not by the Supreme Court's confused and confusing doctrine but by their reasonableness).
8. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 2 (2006) (predicting that successful
terrorist attacks will result in a proliferation of repressive laws undercutting civil liberties).
9. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
381 (1974) (explaining that the "maxim that the eye or ear could not commit a search" traces "back
to English common law and had been mentioned by Lord Camden in his celebrated judgment in
Entick v. Carrington, which has always been justly received as something of a lexicon of the
'original understanding' of the fourth amendment.").
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open fields, 10 curtilage,11 garbage bags, 12 pen registers, 13 and dog sniffs. 14
Second, any conclusions from before 9/11 may not properly factor into the
equation the very real possibility of the next catastrophic attack; 9/11, a di-
viding line between eras, continues as a major marker in policy making and
legal analysis.
Definitions are important. My use of the term "physical surveillance"
attempts to separate this analysis from an analysis of "electronic
surveillance." The attempted distinction is between FBI agents on the street
and National Security Agency computers that suck in e-mail, telephone, and
other signals. But physical surveillance is also a bit of a misnomer. FBI
agents do not usually seek to make physical contact with their suspects dur-
ing surveillance; in many cases, the FBI does not want the suspects to know
they are being observed. 5 Watching from the shadows, the FBI hopes sus-
pected bad guys will take the FBI to other bad guys. 16 So this sort of
surveillance might also be called "visual surveillance."
Imagine teams of FBI agents following a suspected terrorist in New
York City. A team in the lobby across the street watches the suspect leave
his apartment on the Upper West Side. They take photographs. Another
team joins him on the Number One subway headed downtown. Several
teams watch the entrances to 125 Broad Street, the downtown building where
the suspect has an office. They use binoculars. Hours go by. Another team
tails the suspect by car as he rides out of the garage, driven by another person
toward Newark. Helicopters and planes assist the agents on the ground. A
command post at FBI headquarters guides their action. Although the agents
do not develop enough information for an arrest, they continue to be
10. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1058-59 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to police searches in open fields).
11. See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Justice Powell's Garden: The Ciraolo Dissent and Fourth
Amendment Protection for Curtilage-Home Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 551, 559-65 (2007)
(describing the Supreme Court's treatment in Ciraolo of pre-Katz curtilage doctrines).
12. See, e.g., Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 616-24 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), that property owners have no subjective expectation
of privacy in their garbage that society would accept as "objectively reasonable").
13. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of
Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes's Jorde Lecture, 97 CAL. L. REV. 407, 427-28 (2009)
(lamenting the lack of pen-register reports by Congress as authorized by the Pen Register Act).
14. See Savage, supra note I (discussing a case in which prosecutors argued that a dog sniffing
the air does not amount to a search).
15. See Weekend Edition Saturday: FBI Surveillance Team Reveals Tricks of the Trade (NPR
radio broadcast July 5, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.
php?storyld=92207687 (describing a variety of FBI surveillance techniques designed to ensure that
suspects are unaware of the FBI's presence).
16. See Talk of the Nation: How to Prevent Home Grown Terrorism (NPR radio broadcast Dec.
15, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=l 21473067




suspicious based on their read of the suspect and on tips from the Intelligence
Community. The FBI is not allowed to use these tips in a search warrant,
however, because the Intelligence Community insists on full protection for
its sources and methods as the price for its cooperation on this case. Not sure
what else to do, the FBI adds teams and resources. In early September, the
suspect, backing up on the sidewalk and looking into shop windows on
Columbus Avenue, spots the surveillance. The original operation is blown.
Next, as a sort of deterrence, the FBI agents decide to make the
surveillance even more visible to the suspect. Everywhere the suspect goes,
he knows he is being watched: at home, at work, and in the coffee shop
where he smokes a water pipe with friends. His family and friends also see
that he is being watched. The surveillance goes on for months. It is
expensive-and often boring for the agents. If the law made sense then this
sort of open, pervasive physical surveillance would fall under the Fourth
Amendment.' 7 Unfortunately for the suspect, Fourth Amendment law is not
always rational. And the line between investigation and harassment is not
always clear.
Terrorism investigations can go from boring to exciting in the click of a
trigger. Imagine that the suspect eludes FBI surveillance, and on
September 12, 2011, a synchronized set of bombings goes off around the
United States. From 8:00 a.m. until 8:30 a.m., in fifteen-minute intervals, the
New York subway system, the Washington, D.C. Metro, and the Chicago L
are all attacked. The timing and sophistication of the attacks carry al
Qaeda's evil signs. The bombs, detonated by cell phones, were contained in
backpacks left on the trains. Hundreds are dead, thousands wounded. Panic
has set in, and the American public wants the government to do what is nec-
essary for them to feel safe again. In response, government agents are
everywhere. The physical surveillance is more intense than after 9/11. The
agents on the streets of American cities look like soldiers on battlefields in
Afghanistan. They carry machine guns and wear pistols in holsters. On their
helmets are swiveling cameras that feed into an elaborate closed-circuit tele-
vision system; controllers in the FBI's operations center can thus see the
scene from the agents' perspectives. The agents see the world through spe-
cialized goggles, even more advanced than the infrared devices used by
soldiers in Afghanistan. The new goggles, more penetrating than the scan-
ners in security lines at American airports, allow the agents to see through
people's clothes and skin for signs of hidden weapons. The frantic agents
fear something much worse than the initial attack. With hand-held radiation
detectors, far more sophisticated than Geiger counters from days gone by,
17. The text of the Amendment does not limit its application to clandestine searches and
seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (preventing the government from violating the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures").
1478 [Vol. 88:1475
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they look for signs that al Qaeda has smuggled a real nuclear weapon into an
American city.
Neither this scenario nor the use of technology is far-fetched. Cameras,
infrared goggles, and radiation detectors are part of governmental arsenals.'
8
These technologies can easily be adjusted and combined for law enforcement
purposes.
Across the Atlantic, British residents are accustomed to pervasive
CCTV.' 9 A ride on a bicycle from Hampstead Heath to Hyde Park is re-
corded by hundreds, if not thousands, of cameras. 20 These cameras feed into
command centers around the city.2' In this area of government intrusion, the
British public seems more resigned than the American public to losses in
their privacy. Having endured a time of troubles when the IRA regularly
bombed targets, the British lost their innocence long before 9/1 1.22 Thus,
Americans may be catching up to their British cousins on CCTV.
On traditional battlefields, the American soldier's use of infrared
goggles gives him a distinct advantage over enemies whose gear is less
advanced. At times, the American can literally see through walls,23 and
fighting after the sun has set is still possible because he can see through the
blackness of night.24 Military technologies, of course, often lead to civilian
variations.25
Radiation detectors were visible to some people in American cities after
9/11.26 Whether the American government acknowledged the specifics or
not, any driver heading into Washington, D.C., could easily project an offi-
cial purpose onto the cables and cords strapped down to main roads and
attached to black boxes. Many drivers may have assumed the plain vans in
18. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano, FBI Monitors for Radiation at Some Mosques, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2005, at A 16 (asserting that "investigators used special equipment to gauge radiation levels
at homes, businesses, warehouses and centers of some Muslim groups").
19. See, e.g., Helen Carter & David Ward, CCTV Captures a Boy on a Bike-Thirty Seconds
Later He Had Killed Rhys Jones, GUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/
sep/27/topstories3.ukguns (describing CCTV's role in a murder investigation in Liverpool and calls
to enhance the system).
20. See Louise Osborne, Hundreds of CCTV Cameras Watch Surrey Boroughs, GET SURREY,
Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/s/2056165_hundreds-of cctv cameraswatch_
surrey-boroughs (revealing that one small borough in England added 493 surveillance cameras over
a one-year period).
21. See Chiltern Dist. Council, How Does the CCTV Work?, http://www.chiltern.gov.uk/
site/scripts/documents-info.php?documentD=57&pageNumber=3 ("Specially trained staff monitor
the CCTV pictures in a secure control room in High Wycombe.").
22. See STEVE HEWITT, THE BRITISH WAR ON TERROR 9-28 (2008) (chronicling the British
history with terrorism, focusing on violence with Ireland).
23. See ROBERT L. SNOW, TECHNOLOGY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 90 (2007) ("[S]everal
manufacturers have developed portable, handheld devices that can see through . . . walls and detect
motion on the other side.").
24. See id. (describing a "flashlight that illuminates the area with infrared radiation, allowing
police officers with infrared sensing devices to see clearly in darkened areas").
25. See id. (noting that local law enforcement now uses sophisticated technology).
26. Id. at 68.
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traffic contained even more sophisticated devices to detect biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons. As a faithful former public servant, I neither
confirm nor deny.
The use of cameras, goggles, and radiation detectors may increase the
government's chances of detecting terrorist plots. But, in a sort of
boomerang, their pervasive use, much like the national threat levels
perpetually at orange and red, may contribute to the fear that is the terrorist's
goal. Whether they are used in the nation's counterterrorism arsenal has as
much to do with politics as it does with law. The political calculations after
the next attack, no doubt, may be much different from the calculations during
the long lull in the homeland. Let us hope this lull lasts. And let us put some
reasonable rules in place in advance.
III. The Legal Framework of Fourth Amendment Searches
A. The Supreme Court
Two Supreme Court cases, Katz and Kyllo, are important in determining
whether simple or sophisticated surveillance constitutes a search. Katz v.
United States, decided before the age of terror, was an important shift in the
Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, made clear the Court's rejection of a prior emphasis on physical
trespass: "Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure. ' 7 Justice Stewart decided that the government's
listening to and recording of calls in a phone booth was a search that required
a judicial warrant, something the government had not obtained.28 He empha-
sized the importance of a neutral magistrate in authorizing searches as much
as the notion that the Fourth Amendment did not always depend on
trespass.2 9 In reaching his conclusion, Justice Stewart did not present a list of
factors-or that much analysis: "The Government's activities in electroni-
cally listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 30 Thus, the "public" phone booth played an important role in
"private" communications. Overall, Justice Stewart tried to distinguish
between what a person "knowingly exposes to the public" and what "he
seeks to preserve as private.
3 1
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 354-55.
30. Id. at 353.
31. Id. at 351.
1480 [Vol. 88:1475
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Academics and other judges might criticize Justice Stewart for not
saying more on what made the government activity in Katz a search. Wiser
commentators might see that Justice Stewart realized that some concepts
such as "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "reasonable care" do not lend them-
selves to precision. Indeed, the attempt at too much precision or the use of
multi-factored tests might actually undercut the conclusion. Much like the
time when he knew "obscenity" when he saw it, 32 perhaps Justice Stewart
just knew a search when he saw it.
Justice Stewart's rejection of prior cases and his reformulation of the
term "search" opened up the Fourth Amendment to electronic surveillance.
This decision was part of the package that prodded Congress into regulating
electronic surveillance. 33 Title II134 became the reference for law enforce-
ment searches, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 35 became the
reference for national-security searches within the United States.
From Katz, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is remembered more
than Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court. Justice Harlan questioned
whether the distinction between "people" and "places" was very clear.36
Reference to a place is usually necessary, he believed, in determining
whether a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy.
37
For Justice Harlan, the telephone booth was a "temporarily private place
whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable. 38 So not only did Justice Harlan blur the distinc-
tion between people and places, but he also blurred the difference between
public and private spaces. More famously, he offered a two-part test in de-
termining whether a governmental search had occurred: "[F]irst that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'' 39 This test, as explained below, has found some favor in the
32. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [hard-core pornography]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.").
33. See Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Cooperation, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (2007) (asserting that the Court's decisions in Katz and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), "both led Congress to regulate electronic surveillance out of fear that the
Court would otherwise ban the practice outright.").
34. Onmibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82
Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
35. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).






lower courts. 4 0 Those who support Justice Harlan do not seem troubled that
the second part of his test turns on the malleable term "reasonable."
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, decided
that "the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a
public street" constituted a search and therefore required a warrant.41 This
case was decided a few months before 9/11, and it is quite possible that the
case would have been decided differently if those attacks were factored into
the Court's calculations. For Justice Scalia, it was very important that the
governmental activity was connected with the suspect's home, a place of
maximum constitutional protection from "prying government eyes. 42 While
acknowledging that "visual" or "naked-eye" surveillance is generally not a
search, Justice Scalia said Kyllo presented the question of "how much tech-
nological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if
any, is too much. 4 3 In that regard, both the majority and the dissent in Kyllo
devoted many more words to describing changes in technology than the Katz
Court did. Kyllo was a decision for the wired age.
Justice Scalia saw the use of "sense-enhancing" technology as a search
to the extent it revealed "details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion. 44 Part of the pre-Katz era's empha-
sis on trespass influenced his analysis. Reaching back to the eighteenth
century, he noted "[v]isual surveillance was unquestionably lawful because
'the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass."' 45 Having
separated Fourth Amendment rights from trespass and property law, the
Court still preserved the possibility of "the lawfulness of warrantless visual
surveillance of a home. 46 Further, Justice Scalia rejected as unworkable any
test that would require warrants for technological intrusions of the home only
if they would reveal "intimate details. 47 Because the sophistication of the
technology has "no necessary connection ... [to] the 'intimacy' of the details
,,48that it observes, such a distinction would give police officers no way "to
know in advance whether [the search] is constitutional., 49 Moreover, Justice
Scalia determined that "[i]n the home ... all details are intimate details. 50
No matter how circular the Katz test may be, he maintained a bright line of
40. See infra section III(B)(1).
41. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
42. Id. at 37.
43. Id. at 33.
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)).
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 38.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted).
50. Id. at 37.
1482 [Vol. 88:1475
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Fourth Amendment protection at the entrance of a home.51 Yet, insofar as
his analysis depends on the technology not being in "general public use,,,
5 2
Justice Scalia's protection may not be total. As Justice Stevens noted in
dissent, "the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of
intrusive equipment becomes more readily available. 53
Justice Stevens, writing with ironical relish, accused Justice Scalia of
judicial activism in Kyllo. Instead of trying "to craft an all-encompassing
rule for the future," Justice Stevens advised the Court "to give legislators an
unimpeded opportunity to grapple with these emerging issues rather than to
shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional constraints. 54 Justice
Stevens did not believe the homeowner had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the mere "heat emissions" from his home.55 In addition to heat
emissions, Justice Stevens listed other things in the "public domain": traces
of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, and airborne particulates. 56 Pres-
aging the 9/11 era and the possible use of radiation detectors in this Article's
scenario, he also mentioned "radioactive emissions., 57 For the most part,
Justice Stevens's argument is good for those who do not want any limits on
physical surveillance. Because this sort of surveillance does not violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Stevens does not construe it as a
search.58 Government agents, for him, are free to observe people from places
outside their homes.
Other than passing references from Supreme Court justices, 59 not much
case law examines the limits of physical surveillance, before or after 9/11.60
The subjects of the surveillance may not know what the government is doing,
and if the government does not detain or arrest them, they will not be able to
complain that the government's conduct caused them any harm.61 If they are
51. Justice Scalia does not like the Katz test, even though he uses it to reach the same result. He
suggests a return to an original definition of "search" as looking over or through something or
exploring or examining. See id. at 32-33, 32 n. 1 (citing N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (6th ed. 1989) (1828)). He says that the Court "must take the long
view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward." Id. at 40. Conceding
"searches" in more cases, Justice Scalia would move the emphasis of the analysis to whether those
governmental actions were "reasonable." See Amar, supra note 7, at 760 n.4 (agreeing with Justice
Scalia's belief that reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourteenth Amendment).
52. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
53. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 51.
55. Id. at 45.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 44.
59. See id. at 33-34 (declaring the difficulty of setting limits to physical surveillance as
technology advances).
60. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American
Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 401-02 (lamenting that
current case law leaves many issues with physical surveillance unaddressed).
61. See, e.g., infra subpart III(C).
2010] 1483
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detained or arrested, the government may find it easy under prevailing no-
tions to demonstrate to a court that the physical surveillance did not
constitute a search.62 Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on
physical surveillance, its decisions, including Kyllo, take for granted that this
type of governmental action is not a search.63
In United States v. Knotts,64 for example, the Supreme Court held that
the government's installation and tracking of a radio beeper in a chemical
drum was not a search.65 To reach this result, the Court said that the beeper
did not provide anything the police could not obtain-with more effort-
through visual surveillance in public places. 66 The government tracked the
drum between the chloroform's purchase in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the
defendant's cabin near Shell Lake, Wisconsin.67 Thus, the tracking was not
inside the defendant's home. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist em-
phasized that this case was not about twenty-four-hour surveillance. As he
said, "[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices ... should eventually
occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different consti-
tutional principles may be applicable., 68  Twenty-seven years later, the
Supreme Court has still not returned to the issue which Rehnquist left open in
Knotts: pervasive, physical surveillance.
B. The Lower Courts
The United States Supreme Court has not devoted many pages to
"expectations of privacy" since 9/11.69 Even its opinions related to the
Fourth Amendment have been on other topics.7 ° The lower courts, left alone,
62. See infra subpart Ill(C).
63. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text; cf California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986) (recognizing as legal under the Fourth Amendment an officer's observations of a suspect
who knowingly exposes her activity to the public).
64. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
65. Id. at 285.
66. Id. at 282.
67. Id. at 278.
68. Id. at 284.
69. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
70. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (citing Katz to support the existence of
exceptions to the warrant requirement) (holding that the exception that allows a warrantless search
incident to arrest in a car applies only to the area in which the arrestee might grab a weapon or
destroy evidence); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Katz to support
exceptions to the warrant requirement) (holding that a police officer may enter a home without a
warrant if he has an objectively reasonable basis to believe an occupant is seriously injured or faces
imminent serious injury); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 110, 114 (2006) (using Katz in the
majority to separate Fourth Amendment rights from property law; in dissent, citing Justice Harlan's
Katz concurrence as the outside limit of the Court's inquiry into expectations of privacy) (holding
that consent disputed by a physically present co-inhabitant is no exception to the warrant
requirement); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (citing Katz as an example of
anticipatory warrants in the context of electronic surveillance) (holding that anticipatory warrants do
not violate Fourth Amendment rights and that the Fourth Amendment does not require an
anticipatory warrant to list its triggering condition); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 416 n.6
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continue to answer difficult questions of whether government conduct con-
stitutes a search.71 My goal in surveying these decisions is to determine how
faithful lower courts are in applying Harlan's two-part test and how useful
those two parts are to their analysis. In the federal courts of appeals, there is
a range of faithfulness to Harlan's two-pronged approach for determining
whether government action rises to a search. Some courts apply Harlan by
the book.72 Other courts apply some but not all of Harlan.73 And still others
ignore him, taking another approach.74
1. Application of Harlan
a. Strict Adherence to Harlan's Test.-The federal courts of
appeals that faithfully apply Harlan's test conduct a formal analysis of both
prongs. The Seventh Circuit, for example, said the following in deciding
whether police entry into the common area of a duplex was a search:
[Defendant] has not demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy
with respect to the common hallway. Nor has he shown that any
subjectively held expectation of privacy that he might hold with
respect to that hallway is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable .... Exposing the activities within the common hallway to
the world is inconsistent with a subjective expectation of privacy ....
Even if [defendant] held a subjective expectation of privacy with
respect to the common hallway, the facts of this case and our
precedents reveal that such an expectation would not be "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 75
This is straight from Harlan.76 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit formally
used both of Harlan's prongs. In United States v. King,77 the defendant
stored child pornography on a common network drive but took steps to se-
cure access to his own computer.78 The Court ruled that "[h]is experience
(2005) (citing Katz in dissent to demonstrate a manifestation of an expectation of privacy) (holding
that a dog sniff around an automobile's exterior during a routine traffic stop does not require
reasonable suspicion); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (citing Katz for the necessity of
magistrate-imposed restraint) (holding that a warrant that fails to describe the evidence sought is
invalid and that a search pursuant to this warrant is unreasonable for lack of oversight by a
magistrate).
71. See infra Part III.
72. See infra subsection III(B)(1)(a).
73. See infra subsection III(B)(l)(b).
74. See infra section III(B)(2).
75. United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Yang,
478 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2007)).
76. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
77. 509 F.3d 1338 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
78. Id. at 1339.
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with computer security and the affirmative steps he took to install security
settings demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the files, so the
question becomes 'whether society is prepared to accept [King's] subjective
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable."'' 79 Moving to the second
prong, the court found that "[b]ecause his expectation of privacy was unrea-
sonable King suffered no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when his
computer files were searched through the computer's connection to the base
network.,
80
The federal courts of appeals that faithfully and consistently adhere to
Harlan are the Second,81 Seventh,82 Tenth,83 Eleventh,84 and the D.C.
79. Id. at 1341-42 (quoting United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091, 1097 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
80. Id. at 1342.
81. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that New York
subway riders have a subjective expectation of privacy in the bags they carry into the subway, an
expectation the Supreme Court has recognized as objectively reasonable); United States v.
Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (examining whether the defendant manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in part of a curtilage and whether society would recognize it as
reasonable); Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (using the headings "subjective
expectation of privacy" and "objectively reasonable expectation of privacy" for its analysis).
82. See Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Private schools, by their
very operation, exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy.... Moreover, an expectation of privacy
is objectively reasonable where parents ... expect that the parents' express delegation of parental
authority to school officials will be both acknowledged and respected by government actors."
(citations omitted)); United States v. Figuero-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Without
evidence suggesting that [he] was driving the truck with someone else's permission, he cannot
establish that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Nor can he establish an
objective expectation of privacy ... [because he] failed to produce a valid driver's license .... ");
United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that the defendant
"failed to manifest any ... actual or subjective expectation of privacy" in a vehicle he was
borrowing and therefore did not exhibit any legitimate expectation of privacy); Christensen v.
County of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 459-60 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that there was no subjective or
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy while driving on public streets or parking in a
business parking lot); United States v. Yang, 478 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Because Yang had
no subjective expectation of privacy in the notebooks, we need not reach the objectively reasonable
injury."); United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir. 2006) (analyzing the search of
a garage through Harlan's two-pronged test).
83. See United States v. Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Mr. Romero
unquestionably maintained no subjective expectation of privacy over the bags in the van .... '[He
also] made no showing that ... would have allowed him to drive the car legitimately."' (quoting
United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 1990))); United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d
1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a personal computer Mr. Barrows brought to work
from his home to use for common office functions may have established a subjective expectation of
privacy, but not a reasonable expectation of privacy that society would recognize); United States v.
Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Even though we can conclude that Hatfield had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the space immediately behind his house, this is not an
expectation of privacy that society regards as reasonable, at least with respect to visual observations
made from an adjoining open field."); United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1285-87 (10th Cir.
2003) (examining when a social guest establishes a subjective and legitimate expectation of
privacy); United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The facts that he had
brought some personal property to the premises and that he had plans to reside there in the future
may speak to his subjective expectation of privacy, but they fall short of establishing circumstances
on which an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy could be based."); United States v.
Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 n. I (10th Cir. 2002) ("Because we conclude society is not prepared
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Circuits. 85 The Ninth Circuit also applies Harlan's framework consistently
86
but sometimes drifts into the language of a "legitimate expectation" as
shorthand for the two prongs.87
Finally, while the First Circuit has sometimes used Harlan's test,88 it
does not always do so. In United States v. Paradis,89 the court only used a
reasonable expectation standard,90 never referring to the two prongs. In
United States v. Dunning,91 the court set up Harlan's framework when it
stated that the "[defendant] contends that he had an expectation of privacy in
a letter sent to a girlfriend with whom he had an intimate relationship and an
understanding that the two would save their letters to each other, and that this
expectation ought to be recognized as reasonable. 92 However, the court dis-
missed the two-pronged approach and applied a "legitimate and reasonable
to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the seized University computer, we need not
consider whether Professor Angevine himself had a subjective expectation of privacy.").
84. See United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (analyzing
the subjective and objective expectations of privacy for garbage placed near the curb for the trash
collector); United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that there
is neither a subjective nor objectively reasonable expectation to privacy in a large, high-rise
apartment building, where the front door has an undependable lock).
85. See United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("By zipping up his
jacket, appellant unquestionably evidenced an intent to keep private whatever lay under it. The only
question, then, is whether society is prepared to recognize such an expectation as reasonable.");
Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that even if defendant held a
subjective expectation of privacy in documents transferred from her place of employment, it was
not a reasonable one).
86. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-11 (9th Cir. 2008) (using Harlan's
framework to analyze the computer surveillance techniques that reveal the to/from addresses of e-
mail messages, the IP addresses of Web sites visited, and the total amount of data transmitted to or
from an account); United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that people have neither a subjective nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a
license plate); United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The
government does not dispute that [he] had a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer and
his dormitory room, and there is no doubt that [his] subjective expectation ... was legitimate and
objectively reasonable.").
87. See United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e do not
conclude[] that Davis had less of a legitimate expectation of privacy in his gym bag than one would
have in a suitcase [or] a purse .... [Bly placing his gym bag under the bed, Davis 'manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination."' (citations omitted)).
88. See United States v. Rheault, 561 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) ("We are satisfied that
Rheault's decision to place the gun and drugs inside the washing machine on the third-floor landing
sufficiently evidences an intent to hide them, and thus demonstrates a subjective expectation of
privacy.... [W]e next turn to the much closer question of whether Rheault's subjective expectation
was reasonable."); United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 2005) ("We find that
Samboy failed to argue his subjective privacy interest in the third-floor apartment in the court
below. Moreover, Samboy has not pointed to any evidence to show that his interest in the
apartment was one society would recognize as reasonable.").
89. 351 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2003).
90. See id. at 27, 32 (discussing only whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy and omitting any discussion of a two-pronged test).
91. 312 F.3d 528 (1st Cir. 2002).
92. Id. at 530-31.
2010] 1487
Texas Law Review
expectation" standard, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v.
Illinois.93 This is a sign that the First Circuit is not as faithful to Harlan as its
other decisions suggest; the Rakas Court cited Justice Stewart's majority
opinion in Katz-not Harlan's concurrence-as support for a test that
determines "whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. 94 The Dunning
opinion is an outlier, as later First Circuit decisions applied Harlan's
framework. 95 Yet even in a circuit that is generally faithful to Harlan, there
is a sign of a return to a simpler framework.
b. Relaxed Adherence to Harlan's Test.-There are other courts of
appeals that cite Harlan's framework but then proceed with a derivative
standard. We might refer to this as relaxed adherence. The Sixth Circuit, for
example, explained:
In analyzing whether a subjective expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable, this court considers a number of factors: (1) whether the
defendant was legitimately on the premises; (2) his proprietary or
possessory interest in the place to be searched or the item to be seized;
(3) whether he had the right to exclude others from the place in
question; and (4) whether he had taken normal precautions to maintain
his privacy.
96
The first and second factors, of course, are a throwback to the pre-Katz
framework on what is a search under the Fourth Amendment. 97 The Sixth
Circuit, in another opinion, identified an additional factor: "whether [the de-
fendant] has exhibited a subjective expectation that the area would remain
free from governmental intrusion., 98 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits also used
these additional factors to decide subjective and objectively reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy. 99 While the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits may be
faithful to Harlan's framework by accepting his labels and packaging, their
lists of factors function more like Stewart's totality-of-the-circumstances test.
93. Id. at 531 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
94. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
95. See United States v. Rheault, 561 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (using the two-part test for the
expectation of privacy question); United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 2005)
(holding that there is no expectation of privacy because the defendant failed to argue a subjective
privacy interest and because there is no evidence that the interest is one that society would
recognize as reasonable).
96. United States v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 682 (6th Cir. 2006).
97. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (eschewing past cases that had used
trespass standards and property interests in determining the applicability of the Fourth Amendment).
98. United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005).
99. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2007) (using the factors to
determine whether the defendant had a privacy interest in a company-issued cell phone); United
States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying the factors in deducing whether
Mendoza had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a common area entryway in a duplex); United
States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (using the factors to determine whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in items found at his ranch).
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Other opinions in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits cite the two-
pronged approach but then gloss over the subjective expectation of privacy to
focus only on the reasonable expectation prong. In a case about aerial
surveillance, the Eighth Circuit "assume[d] without deciding that [the
defendant] had a subjective expectation of privacy and focus[ed] on whether
such an expectation could be objectively reasonable." '100 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have also acknowledged Harlan's framework without coming
back to it.101
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits also have outliers. In United States v.
Stevenson,10 2 the Fourth Circuit discussed the two prongs in detail with spe-
cific facts from the record. 10 3 The Eighth Circuit, in analyzing whether a tape
recording was a search, reasoned that "[the defendant] acknowledged, near
the end of the conversation, that his statements were being recorded, and that
this was 'fine' with him. Under these circumstances, [the defendant] could
not reasonably expect that the conversation was private, and there was no
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 1°4 Nevertheless, both
decisions are flanked by others that put their respective circuits within a
camp of relaxed adherence to Harlan.
2. Departure from Harlan.-The Third Circuit departed from Harlan's
two-pronged framework to use the "legitimate expectation of privacy" stan-
dard from Rakas. In United States v. Perez,'0 5 the Third Circuit cited Rakas
for the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects against searches where
persons have "'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'
106
It further explained:
Under this rule, persons in another's apartment for a short time for the
business purpose of packaging cocaine had no legitimate expectation
100. United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Brown, 408 F.3d 1049, 1051 (8th Cir. 2005) ("There was no evidence Brown had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in Lewis's residence, because he was not present during the search, did not
live at the residence, and did not have a key to the residence."); United States v. Hill, 393 F.3d 839,
841 (8th Cir. 2005) ("These cases recognize that regardless of one's subjective expectation of
privacy in a public restroom, society's recognition of that expectation of privacy is limited by the
physical design of the restroom, [its] location. . ., and the probability that one will be asked to
surrender use of the restroom to others.").
101. See United States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 145-46 (4th Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether the
defendant was a social or business guest in Gray's apartment and the appropriate level of privacy
based on societal expectations); United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 560-62 (6th Cir. 2006)
(examining the reasonable expectations of a vehicle's license plate); United States v. Breza, 308
F.3d 430, 433-35 (4th Cir. 2002) (determining the reasonable privacy expectations with regard to
aerial surveillance of the curtilage).
102. 396 F.3d 538 (4th Cir. 2005).
103. See id. at 546-47 (analyzing whether the defendant, having shown an intention not to
return to his apartment, had a reasonable expectation of privacy after his arrest).
104. Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2008).
105. 280 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 337 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).
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of privacy in that apartment. Thus any search which may have
occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Although
overnight guests who are legitimately in a third-party's apartment may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, Appellants do not qualify. 107
However, the Third Circuit has shown some fidelity to Harlan's
framework by applying factors used by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits.108 Even so, the Third Circuit's emphasis on places and privacy in
other cases leaves Perez as an example of a departure from the two-pronged
approach. 0 9 The Third Circuit thus welcomes Stewart over Harlan.
In the other circuits, Stewart's approach would obviate a mechanical
application of Harlan's first prong, freeing the analysis to apply as many
factors as are helpful to the specific facts of the case. Trespass is no longer
an important factor, but the duration and the intensity of governmental action
still matters to people protected by the Fourth Amendment. A return to
Stewart would recognize all this in simpler terms.
C. Shortcomings of the Legal Framework
We have time before the next attack to reach a better equilibrium on
physical surveillance. Related to the subway scenario that started this
Article, I considered three types of surveillance: cameras, goggles, and
detectors." 0 Since the thwarted Christmas bombing plot in 2009111 and
President Obama's call to install more see-through scanners in American
airports," 2 the public has been reminded that surveillance is not just an aca-
demic topic. Of the three forms of surveillance in our scenario, goggles
would seem to present the most problems under the current Fourth Amend-
ment framework.
107. Id. (citation omitted).
108. See Warner v. McCunney, 259 F. App'x 476, 477 (3d Cir. 2008) (using four factors that
are relevant to showing a legitimate expectation of privacy: whether the party had a possessory
interest, whether it could exclude others from the place, whether it took precautions to maintain
privacy, and whether it had a key to the premises); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 n.4
(3d Cir. 2006) (citing to Kyllo for the two-pronged approach but not analyzing the search because
the government conceded the point).
109. See Miller v. Hassinger, 173 F. App'x 948, 952 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)) (providing that to demonstrate a constitutional privacy interest, an
individual must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched); United States
v. Schofield, 80 F. App'x 798, 802 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the defendant must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the automobile to have standing to challenge the search).
110. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
111. See Mark Hosenball et al., The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, at 37, 37 (discussing Abdulmutallab's personal background and the
steps he took in his failed attempt to ignite an explosive device on a plane on Christmas Day 2009).
112. See Associated Press, Body Scanners at More Airports: Passengers Can Choose Metal
Detectors, Patdown Instead, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 14, 2010, at J4 (noting that the Obama
Administration set aside $1 billion of the $787 billion stimulus package for airport screening, $25
million of which was for body scanners).
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The cameras on the agents' helmets would be recording people in public
places; plus, those recordings would not be broadcast on television or the
Internet. When a citizen walks down the street, he accepts that other people
may be watching him-in the same way that cameras may be recording
him. 113 So, even if the United States veered toward the British practice of
CCTV, it would not present a constitutional problem under current law or
under my proposed reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment. 1 4  In reaching
these conclusions, I assume that the cameras perform a general scan of the
crowd without zooming in on a person unless there is a particularized
suspicion.
Similarly, the radiation detectors are safe under current law. The
detectors, to be sure, are not limited to surface readings of people's
movements. Even so, in line with Justice Stevens, I doubt people expect pri-
vacy for the radiological emanations of their belongings. 115  Such
expectations would not be legitimate.1 6 An agent who detects radiation with
the assistance of basic technology is not different for purposes of the law
from an agent who detects the smell of alcohol or marijuana from a suspect
on the street. Neither the detection nor the smelling involves a search.
17
113. Cf John Buntin, Long Lens of the Law, GOVERNING, May 2009, at 24, available at
http://www.goveming.com/article/long-lens-law (praising security cameras as "force multipliers"
that would allow a single police officer at a monitor to perform the surveillance work of several
officers in the field).
114. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2001) (explaining that although "'at the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable government intrusion,"' this has never "'require[d] law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares"'
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213 (1986))); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (holding that aerial
photography of a vast industrial complex did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (noting that "objects, activities, or statements that [a person] exposes to the 'plain
view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited").
115. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Heat waves ... enter the
public domain .... A subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible
but also surely not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.'"" (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
116. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1987) (holding that even if
petitioners may have subjectively expected the contents to remain private, there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public because society
has not recognized an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in such items); id. at 41 ("[A]s
we have held, the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal
activity that could have been observed by any member of the public."); United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) ("The concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the mere expectation,
however well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities."); supra
text accompanying note 39.
117. Cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the use of a drug dog to
detect drugs does not constitute a search under Fourth Amendment case law because the procedure
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People do not have a legitimate expectation in the emanations of things they
carry with them or in the smells, sounds, or sights they emit from their
bodies. The governmental action to detect these things is not usually intense
or longstanding." 
8
The goggles, unlike the cameras and the radiation detectors, see through
a person's clothes. People, guilty or innocent, suspicious or inconspicuous,
will be naked to the agents' eyes. The agents may see who has a replaced
hip, a steel implant in the skull, or a pacemaker. Many people want to keep
these facts private. If the devices detect plastics in addition to metals, the
privacy concerns are more obvious. Some women do not want the world to
know whether the contours to their bodies have been shaped, not by nature,
but by a surgeon's scalpel.
My goal, to repeat, is to show Katz's limitations in protecting American
privacy. Perpetual surveillance occurs with some suspects today; its rele-
vance does not depend on another attack. The scenario about a subway
attack serves as a reminder that physical surveillance can easily become very
intrusive. As a result, a basic totality-of-the-circumstances test, rather than
Justice Harlan's two-part test, is more useful in reaching the common-sense
conclusion that at some point, 24/7 surveillance becomes intrusive enough to
constitute a search. A search by the government then requires probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or, if individual suspicion is not there, some
special need.1 19 Since the courts have recognized that there is a point at
which a canine sniff can become intrusive enough to be a search, 20 they
should be more forthright in recognizing that physical surveillance can
switch categories just as easily. To me, Stewart's test seems more flexible
than Harlan's for factoring the duration and the intensity of governmental
action into the constitutional equation.
is limited "both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of
the information revealed by the procedure").
118. See infra subpart IV(C).
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation .... ); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (upholding
the constitutionality of "information stops" and reiterating that searches absent particularized
individual suspicion may be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment if special law enforcement
purposes-other than general law enforcement--exist); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (reaffirming that, in some instances, a standard less than probable cause-"reasonable
suspicion"-can support the reasonableness of a search in accordance with the Fourth Amendment).
120. See United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 293 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that up-close
canine sniffing offends reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore a search under the Fourth
Amendment but that such searches, if routine, are permissible under the border-search exception to
the warrant requirement); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that canine sniffs of high school students are Fourth Amendment searches); United States
v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a canine sniff outside an apartment
door for the purposes of detecting drugs is a Fourth Amendment search). But see United States v.
Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a canine sniff is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
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Justice Stewart's totality-of-the-circumstances test does not eliminate
ambiguity. No test can. Those who lean toward bright lines might actually
prefer the emphasis on trespass that characterized Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence before Katz.12' They may challenge both Justice Harlan and Justice
Stewart. An advantage of the trespass test is that it avoids murky inquiries
about expectations of privacy. The trespass test does not purport to deter-
mine whether sight, sound, or smell is more intrusive. Instead, trespass is
about simple touch. 122 As long as government agents do not touch suspects,
do not touch their things, and do not stand on their property, the agents
should be fine under the Fourth Amendment. Even under the law before
Katz, constant surveillance was acceptable as long as it followed these rules.
The time has come for change.
IV. Breakdown of the Framework
I am certainly not the first to criticize the Court's test for expectations of
privacy. 123 But I am probably the most explicit, since 9/11, to suggest Justice
Stewart's test as the replacement.
121. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("The permissibility of ordinary visual
surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass." (citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
134-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928))); cf Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (relying on whether an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area" had occurred rather than whether there had been a technical trespass in determining
whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred).
122. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465-66 (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies only to
physical searches and not to searches "by hearing or sight").
123. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 385 (arguing that Katz "offers neither a
comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage nor any positive principles by which questions of
coverage can be resolved"); Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the
Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 825, 852 (1989) ("[T]he outcome of the Katz mode of
analysis has increasingly resulted in the total loss of Fourth Amendment protection."); Marc
Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth
Amendment to a World That Trades Image and Identity, 82 TEXAS L. REv. 1349, 1363 (2004)
(arguing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence "needs rethinking if constitutional privacy
protections are to work well in twenty-first century conditions"); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48
STAN. L. REv. 555, 616-17 (1996) ("[O]ver the past thirty years the Katz approach has degenerated
into a standardless 'expectations' analysis that has failed to protect either privacy or property
interests."); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court,
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 28-29 (2002) ("After a third of a century,
it is fair to conclude that Katz is a failure ...."); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value
and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance,
39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647, 724 (1988) (arguing that since Katz, "the Supreme Court has determined
that individual expectations of government surveillance, even when guarded against, appears wholly
irrelevant"); Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. L.
REV. 8, 8-9 (2002) (arguing that the Court has struggled to keep up with technology and that "[i]n
the last thirty years, a number of investigative techniques-all found to fall outside the ambit of
Fourth Amendment protection-have enabled the government to obtain details about our lives");
John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRtM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1183 (1989) ("The doctrinal record during the twenty years since Katz
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A. Academic Opinions and Problems
Many scholars criticize the Katz framework for not doing enough to
protect people against government snooping. Of those that criticize,
however, very few wade into the differences between Stewart and Harlan.
Their proposals for replacements can be broken into several groups-
although I am mindful of the irony of doing so in an Article that says not to
lose sight of the totality of circumstances.
A large group pushes for a return to a pre-Katz understanding of the
Fourth Amendment, similar to the ruling in Olmstead v. United States.
124
This would tie the definition of a search to the concepts of property. 125 They
reveals a Court hostile to privacy and, of greater concern, willing to ignore or subvert the constraints
of language and structure in its quest for the favored result."); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth
Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 554 (1990) (declaring that "in the two
decades since Katz was decided, the Court has applied the standard to reduce rather than enhance
fourth amendment protections .. allow[ing] the government access to many intimate details about
our lives without having to establish the reasonableness of its behavior"); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 801, 826-27 (2004) ("Indeed, scholars consistently denounce the Court's opinions interpreting
Katz as 'dead wrong,' 'off the mark,' 'misguided,' and 'inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth
amendment."' (citation omitted)); Tracy Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth
Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 51 (2002) (arguing that "the
privacy and security protected by the Fourth Amendment should not depend on innovations in
technology"); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2002)
(aruging that Katz and its progeny do not sufficiently protect privacy since "[m]embers of our
society should be constitutionally entitled to expect that government will refrain from any spying on
the home-technological or otherwise-unless it can demonstrate good cause for doing so"
(emphasis omitted)); William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1048 (1995) (arguing that "[i]f we could start over, perhaps privacy would not
receive constitutional protection anywhere"); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and
the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1451, 1500 (2005) ("The 'expectation of privacy' notion is flawed to the core.");
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two
Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 438 (2002) (asserting that Kyllo insufficiently protects privacy since
"[o]fficial exploitation of a scientific or technological device should be considered a Fourth
Amendment search"); Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of
Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249, 251 (1993) ("Katz
has been a dismal failure ... ").
124. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
125. See Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, supra note 123, at 628 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment's
"ultimate purposes, rooted in the history of the Amendment, were to protect individual liberty,
privacy, and property, and to preserve the capacity to enjoy all three in the quiet of one's home or
place of business"); Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 47-50 (arguing that the jurisprudence should
"emphasize the notion that the technological equivalent of a physical trespass can trigger a Fourth
Amendment violation" as well as "extend this notion to settings outside of the interior of the home.
At the very least, this should include other property that has traditionally received Fourth
Amendment protection, including the home's curtilage, closed containers like luggage, and the
interior private commercial buildings," and that "[t]his amalgam of property law, trespass theory,
and technology could readily be extended to other settings"); see also Blitz, supra note 123, at
1364. Blitz argues that, as opposed to Katz's famous pronouncement,
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say when the government intrudes on a citizen's property, be it with the aid
of technology or by physical entry, it should be a search. Professor Cloud,
for example, contends that the "linkage between property, privacy, and lib-
erty was more effective than is [the Katz rule] at implementing the
Amendment's purposes and was more consistent with its text and history."
126
These critics say Katz changed very little of the analysis, since judges simply
fall back on the time-tested rules of property law.
127
A second group pushes for a return to a more original interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, 128 comparable to what Scalia suggests in Kyllo.
129
For them, Katz has diluted the Fourth Amendment to allow police powers
beyond the founders' vision. As Professor Davies argues, the "authentic
history shows that framing-era doctrine provided a much stronger notion of a
'right to be secure' in person and house than does modem doctrine." 3 0 The
originalists would more directly align the definition of a search with persons,
houses, papers, and effects.
131
[Clourts can often best protect privacy in public life by focusing on places rather than
the people who act in them. Instead of protecting individual expectations of privacy
directly, courts might best protect privacy in public life indirectly by identifying and
protecting those features of our society, including those features of public space, that
allow anonymity and other privacy-related interests to exist in sufficient measure.
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Slobogin, supra note 123, at 1411 (arguing that our society should
be constitutionally protected from "any spying on the home-technology or otherwise-unless it
can demonstrate good cause for doing so" (emphasis omitted)).
126. Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in
Constitutional Theory, supra note 123, at 563.
127. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire,
102 MICH. L. REV. 933, 934 (2004) ("Even when purporting to protect privacy, judges have proven
reluctant to deviate from rules based on principles of property law.").
128. See Benner, supra note 123, at 830 ("[Flor the Framers, the heart of the Fourth
Amendment lay in the requirement that individualized justification be established under oath, as a
necessary predicate to governmental intrusion."); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 724 (1999) ("The Framers aimed the Fourth
Amendment precisely at banning Congress from authorizing use of general warrants; they did not
mean to create any broad reasonableness standard for assessing warrantless searches and arrests.");
Thomas, supra note 123, at 1458 (explaining his method of inquiry as understanding "the common
law relevant to search and seizure and the political context in which the Fourth Amendment was
proposed and debated" and with this in mind proposing "a series of modifications based on what I
think the Framers would have said if they could have seen particular modem police methods.").
129. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (arguing that defining the term "search"
to include obtaining information about the interior of the home that the government could not
otherwise get without physical intrusion would provide the level of protection against government
that existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment); supra notes 41-54 and
accompanying text.
130. Davies, supra note 128, at 749.
131. See Thomas, supra note 123, at 1459 ("[T]he Court's attempt to expand the coverage of
the Fourth Amendment by restating it as protecting privacy is a failure. We need to return to the
plain meaning of 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' as those items would be understood by the
Framers in the context of modem life.").
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A third group shifts away from the Search and Seizure Clause to
highlight the Warrant Clause' 32 or the role that Congress should play.' 33 One
scholar proposes a bright-line rule: "[A]il government use of sophisticated
visual equipment ... should be subject to the warrant requirement."
'1 34
Others say Congress is better suited than the Courts to address privacy in the
context of rapid technological developments. Thus, it is up to the Legislature
to develop "more nuanced, balanced, and accurate privacy rules when tech-
nology is in flux.
135
Finally, similar to my position, a few scholars lend some support to
Justice Stewart's majority opinion, while criticizing Katz's progeny. 136 For
them, Katz is salvageable. According to Professor Swire, "[c]ourts could
engage in a more substantive review of expectations of privacy in specific
factual settings, and find that more categories of government action violate
that test."'' 37 For Swire and others, the solution to search problems depends
on a threshold question. Professor Benner suggests asking "whether Fourth
Amendment protection existed as a threshold matter, and then by
132. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 417 ("A paramount purpose of the fourth
amendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified searches and
seizures. The warrant requirement was the framers' chosen instrument to achieve both purposes,
and it should continue to be applied to those ends .... ); Gutterman, supra note 123, at 732 ("We
must bring technology under the umbrella of the procedural protections of the warrant clause.");
David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563, 629 (1990)
(asserting that "[n]owhere is an appropriate application of the warrant clause more essential to
protect the security promised by the fourth amendment" than for sense-enhancing technologies).
133. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 380 (arguing that effective control over police practices
depends upon, among other things, the creation of new regulatory devices subject to court
oversight); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power
of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1375-76 (2002) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to require legislative approval of any governmental use of new
technologies to better protect privacy against these new innovations).
134. Gutterman, supra note 123, at 733.
135. Kerr, supra note 123, at 807-08. "Legislatures do not offer a panacea, but they do offer
significant institutional advantages over courts." Id. at 807.
136. See Gutterman, supra note 123, at 666 ("The damage had been done in his Katz
concurrence. By basing Katz on a subjective expectation analysis and thereby a risk-assumption
theory, Justice Harlan subjected each and every member of society to unimagined risks."); Junker,
supra note 123, at 1178 ("Katz' weakness, however, is also its strength. It bends in both
directions."); Katz, supra note 123, at 560-63 (arguing that Katz "provided a framework for
ensuring freedom by protecting personal security"); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 175 1,
1755-56 (1994) (arguing that Katz could be the framework for the future of trust in the
government); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 905 (2004)
(arguing that with the development of new technology, Katz may be "dead for [its] core facts," but
that Fourth Amendment doctrine should continue to play a role in governing high-tech searches);
James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth
Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 737 (1985) (proposing an "instrumental
approach to resolving fourth amendment threshold questions [that] will further [the] realization of
the full potential of the Katz revolution"); Yeager, supra note 123, at 308 (arguing that though the
test is flawed, "[wlhen the government is behaving lawfully, Katz acts as a backstop, as a second
look at whether the positive law fairly reflects a given defendant's expectations").
137. Swire, supra note 136, at 923.
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determining whether that protection had, nevertheless, been waived because
it was reasonably foreseeable that the details actually observed by the police
would have also been observed by members of the public."'1 38 A search has
occurred if this threshold test is answered in the positive.
39
B. Common-Sense Answers
Justice Harlan's two-part test cuts out the common sense necessary to
decide whether governmental action is a search. Lost between two layers of
analysis are facts about the depth and duration of the intrusion. The Fourth
Amendment is as much about places as it is people. When we put ourselves
into public settings-a train station, the airport, a subway car, or the street-
we know other people are observing us, but our expectation is for these ob-
servations to be brief and fleeting. Don't stare at me and I won't stare at you.
We blend into the crowd. But if someone looks at us for too long, we be-
come self-conscious. Our anonymity has disappeared, and the exchange with
the observer might become violent, romantic, or something in between. The
tipping point from anonymity to being in the imaginary crosshairs is not
precise. It could take five seconds or ten seconds, but we know when our
space has been violated. These are obvious points, but the jurisprudence of
searches tends to ignore them. Today the prevalence of CCTV in the private
sector, rather than decrease a citizen's constitutional protections, should
mean that the government's addition of visual surveillance more readily tips
the balance toward a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, despite all the talk about expectations of privacy, it is not
clear whether Justice Harlan had in mind a person's expectations about all
possible intrusions (public and private) or just public intrusions. Depending
on the facts, a person may have a different assessment of whether a cop or a
private citizen is lurking about, and society's decision about what is reason-
able may also be affected.
In practice, the cases do not often turn on the first part of the Harlan
test. Many cases in state and federal courts are decided without reported
opinions.140 The defendant who files a motion to suppress will allege that he
expected to be free of the government conduct. The government can try to
show facts that rebut the defendant's allegation or, conceding the first part of
Harlan's test, it can move on to the second part. Further, Harlan's test has
other problems. A pure application of Harlan's test would allow the gov-
ernment to lessen and perhaps eliminate expectations by a ratcheting of more
138. Benner, supra note 123, at 871-72.
139. See id. at 872 n.214 ("By liberally construing the language of the Amendment to effect its
purpose in protecting privacy as mandated by Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886),
much of the need for a Katzian analysis would disappear.").
140. E.g., United States v. Davis, No. 09-30047, 2010 WL 610646 (C.D. I11. Feb. 11, 2010);
Young v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-002049-MR, 2010 WL 323120 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 29,




intrusive activity. Justice Harlan himself eventually recognized this problem.
In dissent in United States v. White, he noted that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is "to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect."'
141
Subjectivity was balanced by some court-imposed objectivity.
More commonly in Fourth Amendment cases, the government concedes
that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy and then moves on
to contest whether the second part of the test has been met. 142 These conces-
sions collapse the test into one line of inquiry on whether the expectations are
reasonable. Thus, the second prong becomes a means for applying Stewart's
test, whether or not the parties and the judges acknowledge it. Although
Justice Stewart and Justice Harlan both agreed that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places,"'143 the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
considered the location of the government activity as a factor in determining
"reasonable" expectations. 44  Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo, as one
example, cannot be fully appreciated without remembering that the thermal
imaging was directed at a home, arguably the most protected place.
145
Yet both Olmstead and Harlan's Katz concurrence are out of date for the
modem world. As seen in the debate between Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens in Kyllo, the distinctions between touch, sight, sound, and smell can
break down. 146 Courts continue to guess at our expectations of privacy. Of-
ten people are too private to speak about their privacy. By taking you to the
toilet, I discuss important things that squeamish judges and other people may
avoid in their opinions and their conversations.
C. Harlan's Test Exposed
Imagine you have entered a public bathroom at the airport in
Minneapolis-Saint Paul. You pick the far stall because it is a bit larger than
the others and because the stall next to it is empty. You clean the toilet lid
before you sit down. You grab a piece of leftover newspaper from the floor,
pull your pants down, and sit down to relieve yourself. Later you find out an
141. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the Government did not dispute that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, then
holding that his expectation was reasonable); United States v. Goldsmith, 432 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169
(D. Mass. 2006) (noting that even though the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of
privacy was at issue, the Government did not dispute his subjective expectation of privacy).
143. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
144. See supra subpart Ill(B); see also, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)
(noting that in the home "all details are intimate details"); United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338,
1342 (1 lth Cir. 2007) (concluding that there is no reasonable expectation for privacy from a
government search conducted through a computer connection to a common network drive); United
States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation
for privacy in a common hallway of a duplex).
145. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 41-58.
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airport policeman was "monitoring" you in one of three ways.' 47 First, a deaf
agent with no sense of smell could have been above you, wedged in the
ceiling. He peered down at you through a small hole. He only saw you in
the middle of your business, not watching your preparations or your use of
toilet paper after you flushed. He did not see your genitalia, only the sight of
you reading with your pants down. Second, a blind and deaf agent could
have been standing on the toilet seat in the stall next to you. He only smelled
what you were doing. Third, a blind agent with no sense of smell could have
been standing on the next toilet seat. He only heard what you were doing.
Luckily for you, you get to pick which possibility is true.
Does it make sense to talk about different expectations of privacy for
these three scenarios? Can we predict what possibility you and others will
find the least invasive? The most? Have we in society really determined
which expectations of privacy in the toilet stall we find reasonable? Have
empirical studies gone that far? And, if so, are they reliable?
The Olmstead test would find these intrusions not to be a search. 48 You
were in a public place, and the agent did not trespass on your constitutionally
protected space. Both the Stewart test and the Harlan test would struggle to
determine whether these intrusions were searches-assuming the agent gath-
ered information of your illegal activity from the intrusion, you were
arrested, and you contested the agent's activity in a motion to suppress. The
Harlan test, however, pretends to be more objective than it is. This Article,
choosing Stewart over Harlan, strives to end those pretensions once and for
all. Stewart's totality-of-the-circumstances test makes more sense and is a
147. The monitoring of public bathrooms is not always hypothetical. Courts have held that
whether bathroom surveillance is a search can depend on the location of the officer and the design
of the stall. See Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (finding that the
expectation of privacy is controlled by the nature of the activity rather than the physical
characteristics of the stall, or the even length of time in the bathroom); Kirsch v. State, 271 A.2d
770, 772 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (holding that an officer unlocking and opening a bathroom door
at the clerk's request after three men had occupied it for thirty minutes did not constitute a search).
Compare Brown v. State, 238 A.2d 147, 150 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (holding that an officer
sticking his head over a stall partition performed a search), and State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800,
804 (Minn. 1970) (holding that an officer surveying a stall through an overhead vent performed a
search because the stall was completely secluded from outside view and the doors and stall assured
the occupants of their privacy), with Moore v. State, 355 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that a police officer looking through a one-half inch crack in the bathroom stall door
is not a search), and Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (holding that
police surveillance from a concealed position above a bathroom stall with no door was not a search
because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy). Notoriously, bathroom surveillance
resulted in the arrest of U.S. Senator Larry Craig in the men's bathroom at Minneapolis-St. Paul
International Airport on suspicion of lewd conduct in June 2007. Senator, Arrested at Airport,
Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 28, 2007, at A19. Police were cracking down after several
complaints of sexual activity in the airport's main men's room. An officer stationed in a stall
arrested Sen. Craig after he made signals that indicated he "[wished] to engage in lewd conduct."
Report from Sgt. Dave Karsnia, Minneapolis Airport Police Dept. (June 26, 2007), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ssi/craig-police-report-082807.pdf.
148. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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more realistic summary of how courts and commentators struggle to balance
individual and governmental interests.
V. Conclusion
You may not worry about the prospect of an extensive Government
Toilet Surveillance Program. But you should worry about government intru-
sions that will come after the next attack. We are all reasonable in expecting
a rational framework for determining whether a government surveillance
program that includes cameras, goggles, and radiation detectors will consti-
tute a search at some point. Justice Stewart's totality-of-the-circumstances
test is better than Justice Harlan's two-part test in distinguishing brief periods
of physical surveillance from constant surveillance that lasts days, weeks,
months, or years. And Justice Stewart's test is much better for analyzing
situations when various methods of surveillance are all combined.
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